Square Pegs and Round Holes: Does Sentencing for Environmental Crimes Fit Within the Guidelines? by Silecchia, Lucia A. & Malinowski, Michael J.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
1996 
Square Pegs and Round Holes: Does Sentencing for 
Environmental Crimes Fit Within the Guidelines? 
Lucia A. Silecchia 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Michael J. Malinowski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lucia A. Silecchia & Michael J. Malinowski, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Does Sentencing for 
Environmental Crimes Fit Within the Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 230 (1996) (with Michael J. 
Malinowski). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
230 Federal Sentencing Reporter. Vol. 8, No. 4, January / February 1996
SILECCHIA AND MALINOWSKI
SQUARE PEGS AND ROUND HOLES: DOES
THE SENTENCING OF CORPORATE
CITIZENS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
FIT WITHIN THE GUIDELINES?
Lucia Ann Silecchia*
Michael J. Malinowski**
Criminalization of environmental offenses began
nearly a century ago with the Refuse Act of 1899.'
Since then, most major environmental statutes have
included provisions defining violations that warrant
criminal penalties.2 What is novel is the tremendous
expansion in criminal enforcement of environmental
law. This unprecedented commitment by federal and
state governments has made environmental crime
"the fastest growing category of environmental law."3
Organizations are a prime target of this new
enforcement effort. From FY 1983 to April 1995, of
1,481 defendants indicted for federal environmental
crimes, 443 were corporations or organizations. 4 To
achieve uniform results in these prosecutions, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission is considering standards for
sentencing corporate citizens convicted of environ-
mental crimes.
The latest proposal for such uniform standards is
the set of Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations Convicted of Environmental Offenses
("Proposed Guidelines"). Written by the
Commission's 18-member Advisory Working Group
on Environmental Offenses, the Proposed Guidelines
were released in November 1993. "The proposal has
strong industry support, and approximately 12 of the
members voting for it have industry ties," one source
said.5 In spite of this support, in 1994 the "Commis-
sion elected not to adopt the Proposed Guidelines,
motivated in part by strong dissension among
members of the advisory group as to the necessity of
a separate chapter strictly for corporate crimes, as
well as by the expiration of the term of Ilene Nagel,
chairman of the advisory group."6 Although the
Commission has thus far declined to submit this
particular proposal to Congress, it will undoubtedly
influence future sentencing proposals.
The Proposed Guidelines draw, in part, on two
sentencing schemes already in place - the guidelines
governing individuals convicted of environmental
crimes7 and the guidelines for organizations convicted
of non-environmental criminal offenses.8 The
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individual environmental guidelines have been
criticized on the grounds that the underlying environ-
mental crimes are non-traditional offenses because, for
example, they lack the classical scienter element and
are too amorphous and difficult to evaluate. In
contrast, the corporate sentencing guidelines have
been critiqued as a forced application of criminal law
to non-traditional offenders since organizations cannot
be imprisoned or criminally sanctioned in the
traditional way, nor can they have guilty minds in
any literal sense. In some respects, the Proposed
Guidelines combine the weaknesses of these two sets
of guidelines-not because of a flaw in the proposal,
but because of the difficulties inherent in prosecuting
an organization for an environmental crime.
This article presents an overview of the Proposed
Guidelines and assesses their potential to improve
both the existing sentencing scheme and, more
importantly, the environmental behavior of corporate
citizens. This analysis concludes that, while the
Proposed Guidelines improve current haphazard
sentencing practices, it is difficult to predict their
efficacy in furthering environmental policy. The
fundamental problem is that traditional criminal
sanctions are not easily applied to non-traditional
offenders committing non-traditional offenses.
Rather than expressing optimism about the Proposed
Guidelines, this paper suggests that the behavior of
corporations could be modified more efficiently
through non-criminal incentives coupled with
increased criminal prosecution of the individuals
responsible for environmentally harmful decisions.
While the Proposed Guidelines provide a more direct
means to implement environmental policy than is
currently available, they may merely streamline
efforts to pound square pegs into round holes.
I. The Proposed Guidelines
The Proposed Guidelines, like the sentencing
guidelines generally, attempt to standardize penalties
imposed on like defendants convicted of like crimes.
Offending organizations are divided into two groups:
"Criminal Purpose Organizations" and "Other
Organizations."9 Criminal Purpose Organizations
("operated primarily for a criminal purpose or by
criminal means") are sanctioned by a harsh, straight-
forward approach: imposition of a fine that "shall be
set at an amount (subject to the statutory maximum)
sufficient to divest the organization of all its net
assets." 10 For the remaining organizations-most
likely the majority-the Proposed Guidelines create a
system that quantifies the organizational criminal
conduct in a way similar to that used for individuals
convicted of environmental offenses."
Administering the Proposed Guidelines is a
multi-stage process. The first step evaluates the
nature of the wrongful act. Specifically, the "base
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offense" level is determined by classifying the act.
The Proposed Guidelines create six categories of
environmental offenses ranging from "Knowing
Endangerment Resulting from Mishandling Hazard-
ous or Toxic Substances, Pesticides, or Other Pollut-
ants" with a base offense level of 24,12 to "Simple
Record Keeping & Reporting," with a base offense
level of 5.13
The base offense level is then adjusted to account
for specific offense characteristics. 4 For example, the
base offense level for mishandling a hazardous waste
is increased by nine levels if the offense "resulted in a
substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily
injury."15
Next, the base offense level is readjusted for
aggravating and mitigating factors that address the
culpability of the organizational actor (as opposed to
the previous adjustments for attributes of the offense).
The base offense level may be enhanced by one to six
levels if management was involved in the
organization's conduct, or if the organization had a
prior criminal or civil compliance history, violated an
order, attempted to conceal the act, or failed to adopt
an environmental compliance program.
1 6
Conversely, the base offense level may be
mitigated by up to six levels if the organization had a
demonstrated commitment to environmental compli-
ance as evidenced by a comprehensive compliance
plan, cooperated and self- reported, or gave prompt
remedial assistance to victims.
7
The final level is correlated to a fine table similar
to the imprisonment table for individuals. For each
offense level, there is a prescribed range of percent-
ages of the maximum statutory fine that must be
imposed. For example, if the base offense level is 12,
the fine must be between 30% and 50% of the maxi-
mum statutory fine. 8 As a final adjustment, the
calculated fine must be reduced if it would be the
unjust result of "excessive repetition of counts" or
would impair the defendant's ability to compensate
victims. 9 Conversely, the fine must be increased if
mitigating factors reduced the offense level by more
than 50% or if the original fine is less than the
organization's "economic gain plus costs directly
attributable to the offense." 20
This method of calculation is simpler than that
outlined in earlier versions of the Proposed Guide-
lines.2' It uses a point system that calculates corporate
criminal conduct in a way similar to the system used
for individuals convicted of environmental crimes,
merely replacing jail time with monetary fine
amounts. This familiar methodology would make the
Proposed Guidelines easy for judges, probation
officers, prosecutors, and potential defendants to
understand and apply. Yet, despite these improve-
ments, the Proposed Guidelines, like their predeces-
sors, contribute to a prosecution process that is itself
fundamentally flawed.
II. Criticisms of the Predecessor Guidelines and the
Applicability of those Criticisms to the
Proposed Guidelines
As noted earlier, the Proposed Guidelines draw
upon both the guidelines for individuals convicted of
environmental offenses and those for corporate
offenders convicted of non-environmental offenses.
Both of these underlying schemes have generated.
concerns applicable to the Proposed Guidelines.
The guidelines for individuals attempt to impose
a consistent sentencing scheme for environmental
offenses which, arguably, are at least once removed
from traditional criminal offenses and often appear
more akin to torts. 2 The most obvious differences
between environmental offenses and traditional
crimes are the amorphousness of the harm,23 the
relative absence of a mens rea/scienter element,24 and
the wide spectrum of environmentally harmful
activities which may be criminalized. Environmental
violations, unlike most crimes, are often not the result
of acts by single individuals done with full knowl-
edge of the nature, illegality and consequences of
those acts. In addition, while traditional criminal law
is concerned with prosecuting only those whose
guilty acts are accompanied by guilty minds,
environmental statutes have criminalized negligent
conduct. Because of these differences, it is uncertain
as to whether and how criminal prosecution of
environmental offenses will achieve added deter-
rence. Yet, in light of the potential impact of environ-
mental crimes on individuals and entire communi-
ties, deterrence should be a major objective of the
enforcement effort.
Moreover, the concern about excessive
prosecutorial discretion is particularly prevalent in
environmental crimes where there are broad policies
governing the choice to prosecute, but little binding
guidance on which the regulated community can
rely.2 Other considerations, such as (1) the impact of
insurance on environmental behavior, (2) the fact that
criminal enforcement of environmental statutes
requires intervention of the Justice Department into
the affairs of the Environmental Protection Agency,
and (3) the reluctance of judges to enforce severe
environmental sentencing guidelines 26 add to this
uncertainty. These factors make environmental
offenders less able to predict the consequences of
their actionsV and further detract from the deterrent
effect of criminal enforcement. Thus, even if the
Proposed Guidelines would help achieve consistency
in sentencing, the effect of this achievement is
undermined by the fact that it may be the only true
consistency in the very subjective process of environ-
mental prosecution.
Many of the differences between environmental
offenses and traditional crimes are exacerbated
because corporations are non-traditional defendants.
Such defendants "have no arms, no legs, no
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conscience-if you cut them, they don't bleed, you
can't put them in jail, and you can't fine them enough
to get their attention."' Prosecuting organizations
reflects the reality that offenses harming the
environment the most are decisions to benefit a
business rather than an individual. Yet corporations
are legalfictions-a fact that requires reexamination
of the rationale underlying prosecution.
The criminal prosecution of corporations for
environmental offenses is a "square peg" in the
scheme of general criminal law, as shown by its end-
result-an additional fine. Corporations are already
aware of potential liability for weighty fines, but
similar fines can be imposed by the civil system. To
the extent added stigma and collateral consequences
are inflicted by criminal prosecution, they are still
imposed upon organizations and result primarily in
the same financial penalty. 29 Criminal prosecution
may thus, to a large extent, duplicate the civil system.
Moreover, although the officials making corporate
decisions may have guilty minds, assessing the guilt
of the corporation is an unrealistic exercise.
The Proposed Guidelines embody the same
shortcomings as the existing guidelines used to
sentence individual environmental offenders. They
fail to increase deterrence because they do little to
address the fact that the underlying criminal statutes
cover such a vast spectrum of behavior-ranging
from clerical errors to intentional endangerment. The
importance of assessing the collective mind of
corporations is downplayed by the fact that the
Proposed Guidelines will result in fines rather than
prison terms. It is not difficult to spot the practical
effects of this shortcoming in applications of the
Proposed Guidelines. In the words of one commenta-
tor, "[w]ith the exception of the top base fine tier for
knowing endangerments, the proposal wrongly starts
by treating all offenses-whether knowing, negligent,
or strict liability offenses-as the same, regardless of
the level of subjective knowledge of applicable legal
requirements and awareness of foreseeable harm."'
The outcome is an application of criminal law that de-
emphasizes the importance of mens rea.
The Proposed Guidelines may also fail to
eibody sound environmental policy by neglecting to
introduce meaningful incentives for good behavior.
For example, under the fine conversion tables, an
offense level score of 25 requires imposition of 100%
of the statutory maximum fine. This means that
many offenses by a corporation may result in the
maximum fine. Despite possible mitigation points for
"commitment to environmental compliance," any
such efforts must be "meaningful" to justify mitiga-
tion. The fact that an environmental offense occurred
will enable prosecutors to argue-with some justifica-
tion-that a given corporation's compliance efforts
were insufficient to warrant mitigation.3
In addition, the fines under the general corporate
offender guidelines have been criticized for being
overly burdensome. Yet, they allow good corporate
citizens to reduce possible fines by 95% based upon
their conduct. In contrast, under the Proposed
Guidelines for environmental offenses, fines may be
reduced by only 50% through mitigation.32 It is
questionable whether this creates a sufficient incen-
tive for a corporation to be a good environmental
citizen. This is particularly doubtful when the self-
reporting and cooperation aspects of good citizenship
come with very vague protections; fear of unprotected
disclosures may prevent organizations from establish-
ing the most expansive self-reporting programs. 3
Regardless of these shortcomings, Congress has
criminalized the environmental offenses of corpora-
tions. Thus, courts deserve the guidance that sentenc-
ing guidelines will provide. They also deserve a
sentencing scheme tailored to organizational environ-
mental offenses. Creation of such guidelines provides
an opportunity to affect environmental policy
directly. Moreover, environmental offenses often
impact entire communities, destroy entire ecosystems,
and harm generations of human beings and wildlife. 34
In light of this, if the Proposed Guidelines improve
the behavior of corporations even a little and bring
about more self-auditing and compliance programs,
they may be worth enacting. There is some evidence
that anticipation of their enactment is inspiring
progress, and creating the impetus for reluctant
organizations to make environmental compliance a
priority.'
Conclusion
The Proposed Guidelines improve the present
scheme to the extent that they are better tailored to
environmental policy than existing guidelines.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to evaluate the Proposed
Guidelines without questioning both the wisdom of
the underlying statutes that criminalize environmen-
tal offenses and the policy of shaping corporate
behavior by prosecuting corporate environmental
criminals.
An effort to standardize sentencing for such
broad groupings of behavior seems forced at best
when applied to organizational defendants. The
criminal prosecution of individuals for decisions they
control has obvious utility.
However, without change to the underlying
statutory scheme, what is to be accomplished through
enhanced criminal prosecution of corporations-other
than a division of the federal government's efforts
and resources committed to protecting the environ-
ment? Such prosecutorial efforts may, in fact, enable
the individuals responsible for environmentally
harmful decisions to escape liability by offering up an
organizational scapegoat. While the standardization
and uniformity that the Proposed Guidelines establish
are good initiatives, the policies behind criminal
prosecution of organizational defendants for environ-
mental crimes must be reexamined. Otherwise, the
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Proposed Guidelines will only assist in forcing square
pegs into round holes.
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